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O P I N I O N  
   
 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Petitioner Carlos Parra-Rojas was convicted of 
Bringing In or Harboring Aliens for Financial Gain, in 
violation of section 274(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2.  Petitioner subsequently applied for adjustment of 
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  The Immigration Judge 
denied Petitioner’s application under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (the “smuggling bar”), which renders an 
alien inadmissible if he has “knowingly . . . encouraged, 
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or 
to try to enter the United States in violation of law”.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will reverse.  
 
I.  Background 
 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia.  He was 
admitted to the United States at age 20 as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1984.  He is married to a U.S. citizen and has a 
teenage son, also a U.S. citizen.   
 
 From 1984 through 2009, Petitioner lived in the United 
States without incident.  On November 16, 2009, he was 
stopped at the High Peaks checkpoint near North Hudson, 
New York, with two passengers in his car.  Upon questioning, 
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Petitioner admitted that he was aware the two men were 
illegal aliens, and that he had picked them up in the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Reservation, on the U.S. side of the Canadian 
border.  He stated that he was to be paid $1,000 to drive the 
men from the border region to locations in Queens, New 
York.  He further admitted that he had performed such work 
on two prior occasions, and was generally paid approximately 
$500 per alien, plus expenses.   
 
 Petitioner was charged with Bringing In and Harboring 
Aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2 (the “brings to” offense), which provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
(2)  Any person who, knowing or 
in reckless disregard of the fact 
that an alien has not received prior 
official authorization to come to, 
enter, or reside in the United 
States, brings to or attempts to 
bring to the United States in any 
manner whatsoever, such alien, 
regardless of any official action 
which may be taken with respect 
to such alien shall, for each alien 
in respect to whom a violation of 
this paragraph occurs . . . (B) in 
the case of . . . (ii) an offense done 
for the purpose of commercial 
advantage or private financial 
gain . . . be fined under Title 18  
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and shall be  imprisoned . . . not 
less than 3 nor more than 10 years 
. . .  
 
Petitioner was also charged with Transporting Illegal Aliens 
in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i) (the 
“transporting offense”), which provides, in relevant part: 
 
(1)(A)  Any person who . . . (ii) 
knowing or in reckless disregard 
of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the 
United States in violation of law; 
transports, or moves or attempts 
to transport or move such alien 
within the United States by means 
of transportation or otherwise, in 
furtherance of such violation of 
law. . . shall . . . (a)(1)(B)(i) in the 
case . . . the offense was done for 
the purpose of commercial 
advantage or private financial 
gain, be fined . . . , imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both . . .  
 
 Petitioner pled guilty to the first charge.  However, the 
second was dismissed on the motion of the Government.  He 
was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. 
 
 On August 22, 2011, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) filed a Notice to Appear with the Immigration 
Court, charging Petitioner with removability under INA § 
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states 
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that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable.”  Specifically, 
Petitioner was charged with committing an aggravated felony 
as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(N), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(N), which specifically includes conduct under § 
1324(a)(2).  On September 13, 2011, Petitioner appeared 
before the Immigration Judge (IJ) and conceded the fact of 
his conviction and removability.  However, Petitioner 
informed the IJ that he intended to apply for adjustment of 
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which provides that such 
adjustment may be granted in the discretion of the Attorney 
General to aliens who are eligible to receive an immigrant 
visa and are “admissible to the United States for permanent 
residence”.1   
 
 The Government conceded that an aggravated felony 
conviction does not, by itself, render an alien ineligible for 
adjustment of status based on inadmissibility.  However, the 
Government urged that Petitioner’s conviction under § 
1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), which provides that, “an alien who at any 
time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or 
aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States 
in violation of law is inadmissible.”   
 
 Following briefing by the parties, on February 23, 
2012, the IJ issued an interlocutory order denying Petitioner’s 
                                              
1
Petitioner contends that he was eligible for an immigrant visa 
by virtue of his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  Petitioner is the 
beneficiary of an approved I-130 Petition for Alien Relative 
filed by his wife.  (A.R. 244.)   
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application for adjustment of status.  The IJ first recognized 
that “a conviction is not required for a finding of 
inadmissibility pursuant to [§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i)].  However, 
since [Petitioner] was convicted [] , the court will address 
these convictions [sic] and the conduct required for the 
offenses.”  (A.R. 267.)  The IJ first discussed Petitioner’s 
“conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) for 
transporting an illegal alien within the United States.  This 
was clear error, because, as noted supra, this charge was 
previously dismissed on motion of the Government; 
accordingly, Petitioner was never convicted of that offense.   
 
 Regarding Petitioner’s actual conviction under § 
1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), the IJ noted that neither the Third Circuit 
nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had issued 
binding precedent regarding whether a conviction for a 
“brings to” offense renders an alien inadmissible under the § 
1182 smuggling bar, and that the BIA had issued two 
unpublished, non-precedential decisions on the issue that 
appeared to contradict one another.
2
  The IJ referenced 
                                              
2
 In Matter of Sergia Arce-Santibanez, 2006 WL 3252534 
(BIA 2006), the BIA held that an alien’s conviction for a 
“brings to” offense rendered her inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), despite the fact that the alien’s conduct was 
limited to transporting aliens after they had already entered 
the United States.  In that case, the BIA found that the 
language of the “brings to” offense “clearly falls within the 
definition of” § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), and that it was “irrelevant 
that the respondent may not have actually aided the illegal 
entry of an alien; she was convicted of doing so.”  In Matter 
of Antonio Reyes-Huereca, 2008 WL 486877 (BIA 2008), the 
alien’s conviction was not for a “brings to” offense, but rather 
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Petitioner’s Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR), which 
stated that Petitioner knew that he was involved in an alien 
smuggling organization and that he had smuggled aliens on 
two occasions prior to his arrest.  “However,” the IJ noted, 
“the PSR makes plain that [his] conviction is based on 
transporting aliens who were already in the United States, 
rather than sheparding [sic] them across the border.”  (A.R. 
269) (emphasis in original).   
 
 The IJ reasoned that Petitioner’s conduct, though 
limited to transporting aliens within the United States, was 
“integral to the overall scheme of alien smuggling.”  (A.R. 
269-70.)  Accordingly, the IJ held that Petitioner was 
inadmissible “due to [his] conviction.”  (A.R. 270, citing 
Soriano v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2007).)  Because 
the IJ appeared to believe Petitioner had been convicted of 
both the transporting offense and the “brings to” offense, it is 
unclear whether his reference to “such conviction” referred to 
the (mistaken) transporting conviction, to the “brings to” 
conviction, or to both.
3
  The IJ issued a final decision 
                                                                                                     
for aiding and abetting the transportation of an undocumented 
alien within the United States.  Id.  The BIA held that the 
transporting conviction, “standing alone . . . does not support 
a . . . charge of inadmissibility.”  Id. 
3
 The IJ’s citation to Soriano, which he originally discussed in 
the context of the transporting offense, suggests that he may 
have intended his holding to mean that Petitioner’s 
transporting conviction rendered him inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  (A.R. 270.)  Again, such holding would 
have been in error, as Petitioner was not convicted of a 
transporting offense. 
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ordering Petitioner removed to Colombia on November 27, 
2012.  (A.R. 40.) 
 
 On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision to 
pretermit Petitioner’s application for adjustment of status, 
holding that Petitioner had not met his burden to show that he 
was not inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  The BIA 
rejected Petitioner’s argument that the language of § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), which prohibits assisting, abetting, or aiding 
aliens “to enter or attempt to enter” the United States, is more 
narrow than the criminal “brings to” statute under which he 
was convicted.  The BIA noted that it is not necessary that an 
individual be physically present at the border crossing to be 
held inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  Rather, the BIA 
opined, it is enough that Petitioner participated in a scheme to 
aid illegal entry.  Accordingly, the BIA concluded that 
“bringing or attempting to bring an alien to the United States 
corresponds with assisting, abetting or aiding an alien 
entering or trying to enter the United States.”  (A.R. 3.) 
 
 Petitioner also argued that his conviction for the 
“brings to” offense did not prove a violation of  § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) because the criminal statute requires that the 
individual charged have acted either “knowing[ly] or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received 
prior authorization” to enter the United States, while § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) requires that the alien have acted 
knowingly.
4
  The BIA noted that “[t]he record of conviction 
is inconclusive, as the Indictment charged the [Petitioner] in 
the disjunctive of having committed the act either knowingly 
                                              
4
 The IJ did not address this argument in his February 23 
order, though it was raised in the parties’ briefing.   
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or with a reckless disregard.”5  (A.R. 4.)   To determine 
whether Petitioner’s conduct had been knowing or reckless, 
the BIA examined the PSR, which stated that Petitioner had 
admitted to knowing that the aliens he transported lacked 
authorization to come to the United States.  Accordingly, the 
BIA held that Petitioner had not established that he did not act 
with the requisite mens rea, and affirmed the IJ’s finding of 
inadmissibility.
6
   
 
 On appeal, Petitioner raises two arguments.  First, 
Petitioner argues that his conviction for the “brings to” 
offense did not render him inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  He argues that the record of conviction 
alone fails to establish that he acted with the requisite mens 
rea, and that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding by 
examining the PSR to determine that he acted with 
knowledge that the aliens lacked authorization to enter the 
United States.  Nor, he argues, does the statute of conviction 
establish that his conduct satisfied the requirements of § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), because the language of the “brings to” 
offense is broader than that of the smuggling bar, which 
                                              
5
 As Petitioner notes in his brief (Pet. Br. 18), this statement 
was error, as the Indictment in fact charged Petitioner 
conjunctively, as having acted knowingly and in reckless 
disregard.  (See A.R. 155.) 
6
 Because the BIA held that Petitioner was inadmissible due 
to his conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), it declined to 
reach whether his “conviction” for the transporting offense 
under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) also rendered him inadmissible.  
(A.R. 4.)  Again, this was in error, as Petitioner was not 
convicted of a transporting offense.   
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requires assistance with the actual entry of the alien into the 
United States.   
 
 Second, Petitioner argues that, setting aside the statute 
of conviction and examining his actual conduct, he is not 
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) because he did not have 
any involvement whatsoever with the aliens’ actual entry into 
the United States, but merely transported them within the 
United States after their entry was complete.   
 
II. Standard of Review 
  We review decisions of the BIA under INA § 242, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252.  Our review is limited to constitutional claims 
and questions of law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  We exercise 
plenary review over the BIA’s legal conclusions, recognizing 
that the BIA’s interpretation of the INA is entitled to 
deference.  See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 
2004).  The burden is on the alien seeking adjustment of 
status to demonstrate that he is admissible.  8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(4)(A)(i).  We will reverse the BIA’s ultimate 
determination of inadmissibility only if it is “manifestly 
contrary to law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C).   
 
III.  Discussion 
A.  Relevance of the Conviction 
 The Government’s argument, in a nutshell, is that the 
requirements of the § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) smuggling bar overlap 
with those of the criminal “brings to” offense, and therefore, 
because Petitioner was convicted of a “brings to” offense, his 
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conduct must also render him inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  We disagree. 
 
 As an initial matter, it is undisputed that an alien need 
not be charged with or convicted of any criminal offense in 
order to be deemed inadmissible under the smuggling bar.  
See Barradas v. Holder, 582 F.3d 754, 761 and n.4 (7th Cir. 
2009).  Indeed, the IJ conceded this in his February 23 order.  
(A.R. 267.)  Accordingly, courts deciding admissibility under 
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) typically examine the underlying conduct 
at issue.  See, e.g., Ramos v. Holder, 660 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 
2011); Urzua Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Soriano, 484 F.3d 318; see also Fernandez v. 
Holder, 422 Fed. App’x 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2011) (under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), “the analysis focuses on the actual conduct 
rather than on a conviction for a criminal offense”) (citing 
Soriano).  The Government has not pointed to any legal 
authority for the proposition that a court should consider the 
fact of Petitioner’s conviction, rather than his actual conduct, 
in determining admissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), and we 
decline to read into the INA any such requirement here.  
Accordingly, because Petitioner’s conviction for the “brings 
to” offense is not determinative of his admissibility under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i), we look to Petitioner’s actual conduct to 
determine whether he is inadmissible.
7
 
                                              
7
 Even if Petitioner’s conviction under the “brings to” statute 
must be considered, we disagree with the BIA that the 
requirements of that statute necessarily overlap with those of 
the smuggling bar.  As originally drafted, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 
barred “bringing aliens into” the United States, a phrase that 
certain courts interpreted as synonymous with “entering” the 
United States.  See, e.g., United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 
13 
 
B.  Petitioner’s Conduct 
 We assume, without deciding, that we may look to 
Petitioner’s PSR, as the IJ and BIA did, to inform ourselves 
of the conduct underlying the BIA’s finding of 
inadmissibility.  Because the PSR provides additional facts 
regarding Petitioner’s activities beyond those contained in the 
record of conviction or the proceedings below, we summarize 
those facts here. 
 
 A few months prior to his arrest, Petitioner was laid off 
from a period of long-term employment and had been unable 
to find work.  As he discussed his situation with several other 
people at a Colombian bakery, he was approached by a man 
he came to know as “Fernando”, who had overheard the 
                                                                                                     
289, 299 (S.D. Fla. 1980).  In response, “[d]eliberately 
overruling case law requiring entry to sustain a smuggling 
conviction, Congress replaced the words ‘brings into’ with 
the words ‘brings to.’”  United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 
F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 682(1), 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1986)).  On the other hand, despite 
amending the civil smuggling statute on numerous occasions, 
including eliminating the “for gain” requirement, Congress 
has retained the words “encouraged, induced, assisted, 
abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the 
United States . . . .” (emphasis added) in the civil smuggling 
statute, encompassing a narrower range of conduct than the 
words “brings to.”  Because the criminal statute is broader 
than the civil statute, it is inappropriate to hold Petitioner’s 
conviction under the criminal statute to be determinative of 
whether he is inadmissible under the civil smuggling statute 
without inquiring into his actual conduct.   
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conversation.  (A.R. 164.)  Fernando indicated that he knew 
of an employment opportunity, and he and Petitioner 
exchanged contact information.  Fernando later contacted 
Petitioner and informed him that he could make money by 
“driving to upstate New York and picking up people.”  (A.R. 
164.)  Fernando put Petitioner in contact with another person 
who Petitioner came to know as “Cale.”  Though Petitioner 
never met Cale, he believed that Cale was Colombian and ran 
a smuggling operation from Canada.  (A.R. 162.)   
 
 Petitioner’s first trip for Cale took place in early 
October 2009.  He was paid $1,300 to pick up two aliens in 
Hogansburg, NY.  (A.R. 162-63.)  The second trip occurred 
approximately two weeks later, again in Hogansburg, and 
Petitioner was paid $1,000 to pick up three aliens.  (A.R. 
163.)  On each trip, en route to and from the pick-up 
locations, Petitioner was in regular contact with Cale, who 
gave him detailed instructions.  (A.R. 164.)  His third and 
final trip, which led to his arrest, took place on November 17, 
2009.  (A.R. 162-63.)  Again, Petitioner picked up the two 
aliens in Hogansburg. (A.R. at 163.)  The record indicates 
that they had each been in the United States for several days 
at the time Petitioner picked them up.  (A.R. 162.)   
 
 In the context of immigration law, “to enter” is a term 
of art referring to an alien crossing the United States border 
free from official restraint.  United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 
309 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
Rivera-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Accordingly, to be held inadmissible for having “encouraged, 
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or 
to try to enter the United States,” § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), an 
individual must have performed one of these actions with 
15 
 
respect to the actual entry of an alien into the United States.  
See also Tapucu v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 736, 740 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he provision . . . requires an affirmative and illicit 
act of assistance in shepherding someone across the border.”).   
 
 It is certainly true that, to be inadmissible under the 
smuggling bar, an individual need not be physically present at 
the border crossing.  However, here, there is no evidence that 
Petitioner performed any act encouraging, facilitating, or 
otherwise relating to the aliens’ entry into the United States.  
The record contains no indication that Petitioner knew or had 
contact with any of the aliens prior to transporting them after 
they had already been dropped off inside the United States.  
See Urzua Covarrubias, 487 F.3d at 747 (“[W]e now hold 
that alien smuggling as defined in § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) . . . 
continues until the initial transporter who brings the aliens to 
the United States ceases to transport the aliens.”).  Nor is 
there any evidence that Petitioner provided any financial or 
other assistance to the aliens he transported prior to their 
entry into the country.  As the IJ acknowledged, Petitioner’s 
conduct was strictly limited to picking up the aliens once they 
had already crossed the border and transporting them from 
one area in the United States to another.  (A.R. 269.)  
Accordingly, by the plain text of the statute,  
§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) does not apply to Petitioner’s conduct.8 
                                              
8
 Indeed, in United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 
2006), the Ninth Circuit found that conduct similar to that at 
issue here did not even constitute a “brings to” offense under 
§ 1324(a)(2).  In, Lopez, an alien made arrangements with 
another person to pick up several aliens who had already 
crossed the border into the United States, and to drive them to 
El Centro, California.  Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit held 
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 To be sure, there are cases finding an individual 
inadmissible where he did not actually cross the border with 
other aliens but merely met them inside the United States and 
transported them thereafter.  However, in those cases, the 
alien had personal involvement with the smuggled aliens 
prior to their entry that constituted “assistance” or 
“inducement”.  For example, in Ramos, parents did not 
actually cross the border with their four children, but rather 
sent each child money to pay a smuggler to help them do so.  
The court held that “an affirmative act that facilitates the 
illegal entry, such as financial assistance, may suffice” to 
satisfy § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  Ramos, 660 F.3d at 205; see also 
Hernandez-Guadarama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 676 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (alien picked up seven other aliens in Mexico and 
drove them to the border, and arranged to pick them up after 
they crossed over into the United States and transport them to 
Washington); Sanchez-Marquez v. INS, 725 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 
1983) (alien found inadmissible under the precursor to the 
                                                                                                     
that “the offense of bringing an alien to the United States 
terminates . . . when the person who transports the aliens to 
the country terminates his act of transportation and drops off 
the aliens in the United States.”  Id. at 1191.  The court noted 
that “a person who moves aliens from one location in the 
United States to another has not brought those aliens ‘to’ the 
United States, has not acted extraterritorially, and has not 
committed a ‘brings to’ offense.”  Id. at 1195.  In holding 
thus, the court overruled its previous decision in United States 
v. Ramirez-Martinez, 273 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2001), which had 
held that “if the defendant is involved in any ‘concerted 
action’ to bring an illegal alien to the United States he is 
guilty of the ‘bringing to’ crime.”  Id. at 1209 (Bea, J., 
dissenting).   
17 
 
smuggling deportation provision when he met seven aliens in 
Mexico and promised to drive them from San Antonio to 
Chicago if they met him on the American side of the border); 
Matter of Corral-Fragaso, 1966 BIA LEXIS 3 (1966) (while 
visiting Mexico, alien made arrangements with another alien 
to pick him up in El Paso and take him to Chicago).  In each 
of these cases, the individual charged with inadmissibility 
made arrangements with an alien before the latter entered the 
United States, and either provided assistance in facilitating 
the entry or induced the alien to enter the country by 
promising transportation upon arrival.  
 
 It appears that the only case where, as here, an 
individual has been found to be inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) absent evidence that he had any actual 
involvement with the smuggled aliens prior to the their entry 
into the United States is Soriano.  In Soriano, relied upon 
heavily by the Government, the accused alien made contact 
with three other aliens in a restaurant in El Paso, Texas, and 
drove them to a gas station.  The court found Soriano 
inadmissible, stating that “[a]ny alien seeking admission to 
the United States who participates in a scheme to aid other 
aliens in illegal entry is inadmissible under the language of § 
1182, regardless of whether the individual was present at the 
border crossing.”  Soriano, 484 F.3d at 321 (citing Sanchez-
Marquez).  However, the opinion does not indicate what 
precise conduct Soriano was found to have engaged in, 
whether he had known the aliens prior to their entry to the 
United States or whether he had personal involvement with 
their entry into the country.  Here, on the other hand, the 
record is clear that Petitioner had no involvement with the 
aliens prior to their entry to the United States, did not provide 
any assistance, financial or otherwise, in their entry, and did 
18 
 
not commit any other “affirmative act” that encouraged, 
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided the aliens’ entry, as 
required by § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).   
 
 Moreover, the INA creates a separate crime—the 
transporting offense—that more appropriately encompasses 
Petitioner’s actual conduct (although, as noted above, 
Petitioner was not convicted of a transporting offense).  Had 
Congress wished to include transportation of aliens within the 
United States as a ban to admissibility, as it did with the 
smuggling bar, it presumably could have done so.  However, 
absent any evidence of an intent to expand the reach of the 
otherwise plain language of § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) to include 
anyone who is in any way associated with a scheme or plan 
relating to “entry,” we think that reading the smuggling bar to 
include Petitioner’s conduct is unwarranted.9   
                                              
9
 Other courts have agreed that mere transportation of an alien 
within the United States, even if done knowingly, does not 
suffice to establish inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  
See, e.g., Rodriguez-Gutierrez v. INS, 59 F.3d 504, 509 n.3 
(5th Cir. 1995) (“Rodriguez was convicted for transporting 
illegal aliens rather than for aiding and abetting an entry. 
Therefore, he is not excludable under section 
1182(a)(6)(E).”); Matter of Antonio Reyes-Huereca, 2008 
WL 486877, at *3 (a transporting conviction, “standing alone 
. . . does not support a . . . charge of inadmissibility”); Matter 
of Maria Guadalupe Garcia De Sanchez, 2005 Immig. Rptr. 
LEXIS 11746, at *3 (BIA 2005) (a conviction for a 
transporting offense “does not establish that the respondent 
has knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or 
aided any other alien to enter or try to enter the United States 
in violation of law”). 
19 
 
  We therefore hold that Petitioner’s conduct did not 
constitute encouraging, inducing, assisting, abetting, or aiding 
another alien to enter the United States.  Because we hold that 
Petitioner’s conduct does not satisfy the requirements of the § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) smuggling bar, we do not address 
Petitioner’s other argument regarding whether he acted with 
the requisite mens rea.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will grant the petition 
for review.  The judgment of the BIA is vacated and the BIA 
is ordered to remand the matter to the Immigration Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion on 
Petitioner’s application for adjustment of status under 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
